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ARTICLES
OBJECTS OF ART; OBJECTS OF PROPERTY
Gregory S. Alexander*

Seemingly worlds apart, art and the law of property in fact share
much in common. Some of this shared space is obvious, the result of
their intersection through property law's protection and regulation of art.
But another aspect of their commonality is considerably less obvious.
Both rely, implicitly and in ways not always acknowledged, on assumptions about objects in the world-thing-ness. That is, both have relied, or
traditionally have done so, on certain assumptions about the nature of
objects-the objects of art and the objects of property-and the upshot
of those assumptions is that those objects are characterized by thing-ness,
i.e., physicality, tangibility, stability, durability. Further, these assumptions are not only parallel to each realm but intersect with each other in
functional ways. Notably, property law's interaction with art depends
upon art's assumption of its own thing-ness, for property law itself traditionally has depended upon certain assumptions regarding the nature of
property-what can be property. It has assumed that art is a tangible.,
stable, and durable object.
Genres of art, whose genesis date back to the 1960s, have problematized these assumptions about the nature of art, i.e., its thing-ness. This
was precisely the point of that genre known as conceptual art, which Sol
LeWitt defined in the following terms:
In conceptual art the idea or concept is the most important aspect of the work. . . . In other forms of art the
concept may be changed in the process of execution....
When an artist uses a conceptual form of art, it means
that all of the planning and decisions are made beforehand and the execution is a perfunctory affair. The idea
becomes the machine that makes the art.'
* Gregory S. Alexander is the A. Robert Noll Professor of Law at Cornell Law School.
His degrees are B.A., University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1970; J.D., Northwestern
University School of Law, 1973. He has been at Cornell since 1984.
1 Sol LeWitt, Paragraphson Conceptual Art, 5 ARTwORUM 10, 79-84 (1967), reprinted
in CONCEPTUAL ART: A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY 12, 16 (Alexander Alberro & Blake Stimson
eds., 1999).
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The whole point of this new type of art was to denigrate the art object so
that the focus would be on the prior abstract idea. Artists like Joseph
Kosuth and Lawrence Weiner threw into question the then-prevailing assumption that the artist's task was to create object objects-certain kinds
of objects, to be sure-but objects nevertheless.
Although the heyday of conceptualism ended by the 80s, its influence on subsequent young artists was enduring and profound. This is
evident in the unique work of F61ix Gonzdlez-Torres, who carried forward the problematizing impulse of conceptualism and combined it with
elements of political activism and expressions of deeply personal experiences. Gonzdlez-Torres' work was also powerfully democratic and participatory, inviting audiences and the public to create meaning with him.
His work's dissolving urge extended not only to its objects but also to
location, blurring the line between public and private spaces.
Many of these themes-putting into question the public/private distinction, the democratizing of the personal, and the importance of community-are also familiar to property law and legal scholarship. Each of
these themes is worthy of discussion, but as a scholar of property law and
property theory, the denigration of the object seems especially so to me.
The reason is that Gonzilez-Torres' work sheds light on an issue that
currently divides property theorists regarding the ontology of property.
In the early part of the 20th century, a group of avant-garde legal
theorists called "Legal Realists" attacked the then-prevailing conception
of property as thing. They set out to show that property is nothing more
than a bundle of rights and other legal relations existing between persons
with respect to interests. This bundle of rights conception of property
quickly caught on and is now the prevailing view in the United States
(although not elsewhere in the world). Lately, a group of legal scholars
has launched a revanchist critique of this conception, arguing that property is the stuff of things. So, Harvard law professor Henry Smith states,
"[P]roperty is, after all, a law of things." 2 But the bundle of rights view
remains strong and has no shortage of defenders. 3
Gonzilez-Torres' work throws the thing view of property in doubt.
Thing-ness is a matter of constancy, stability and, usually, tangibility.
Land is a thing; my watch and my car are things. I can touch them. Their
physical aspects are more or less constant. Their existence is not ephemeral. True, there are counter-examples. A soap bubble lasts only a short
while and is highly unstable. We might question whether a soap bubble
2 Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691, 1691
(2012).
3 See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Two Cheers for the Bundle-of-Sticks Metaphor, Three
Cheers for Merrill and Smith, 8 EcON. JOURNAL WATCH 215 (2011); Stephen R. Munzer, A
Bundle Theorist Holds On to His Collection of Sticks, 8 EcON. JOURNAL WATCH 265 (2011).
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is even a thing, an object, but even if it is, people sometime use the
image of soap bubbles to capture precisely the opposite of the ordinary
properties of things. Is art, then, a thing? Until the appearance of work of
conceptual artists most of us would have supposed so. A painting is a
thing; so is a sculpture. But what of Gonzdlez-Torres' work?

F61ix Gonzalez-Torres
"Untitled', 1991
Print on paper, endless copies
7 in, at ideal height x 45 1/4 x 38 1/2 in. (original paper size)
Installation view: Felix Gonzclez-Torres.
Luhring Augustine Hetzler Gallery, Los Angeles. 19 Oct. - 16 Nov. 1991.
Photographer: James Franklin
D The F61ix Gonzilez-Torres Foundation
Courtesy of Andrea Rosen Gallery, New York

Consider his work titled "Untitled" of 1991, consisting of individual
stacks of paper compiled neatly in cubic form on the gallery floor. In
most of these installations the paper consisted of printed broadsheets that
bore photographic images or oblique texts. In these pieces people other
than Gonzdlez-Torres acted as major contributors to the work. They removed the sheets and replenished them. The piece dematerializes but
endures. Referring to the 1991 installation at the Walker Art Center,
Gonzilez-Torres stated: "This piece requires the participation of the public in order to exist. It's a non-static sculpture, it's always changing, it
can disappear, yet at the same time, it's indestructible because it can
always be reprinted. It's an attempt at creating a more democratic artwork. A public piece." 4
4 Art exhibition label text for F61ix Gonzilez-Torres, Untitled, WALKER ART CENTER
(1993), http://www.walkerart.org/collections/artworks/untitled-2219 (last visited February 6,
2017).
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There are several themes here on which it is worth dwelling because
they also resonate with the Legal Realists' project to destabilize the thenprevailing property worldview. The first thing to notice in "Untitled".paper stacks is the project's thing-ness, or rather its lack thereof. If we
understand things, as we usually do, to be characterized by stability and
identity, then Gonzdilez-Torres' stacks throw into doubt the thing-ness of
these works. Their very thing-ness is ambiguous, neither easily affirmed
nor denied. In one sense they are stable, for, assuming the public or whoever is responsible does its part by replenishing the supply of paper, the
stacks remain. Yet, in another sense, these works are quite unstable.
Their very existence depends upon the cooperation of someone other
than the artist. Moreover, even resupplied, their constituent parts are fundamentally dynamic, constantly changing as pages are removed and added. Eventually, each stack consists of completely new sheets of paper.
At that point can we say that the stack is the same "thing?"

F61ix Gonzdilez-Torres
"Untitled" (Public Opinion), 1991
Black rod licorice candies individually wrapped in cellophane, endless supply
Overall dimensions vary with installation
Ideal weight: 700 lbs
Installation view: Filix Gonzilez-Torres. The Solomon R. Guggenheim Museum, New
York. 3 Mar. - 10 May 1995. Cur. Nancy Spector. Catalogue.
Photographer: David Heald
@ The F6lix Gonzilez-Torres Foundation
Courtesy of Andrea Rosen Gallery, New York
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F6lix Gonzdlez-Torres
"Untitled" (Portraitof Ross in L.A.), 1991
Candies individually wrapped in multicolored cellophane, endless supply
Overall dimensions vary with installation
Ideal weight: 175 lbs
Installation view: Felix Gonzdlez-Torres.
Luhring Augustine Hetzler Gallery, Los Angeles. 19 Oct. - 16 Nov. 1991.
Photographer: James Franklin
@ The F61ix Gonzdlez-Torres Foundation
Courtesy of Andrea Rosen Gallery, New York

Another theme to notice in this series of projects is the blurring of
the line between the public and the private. As the statement from Gonzlez-Torres that I quoted earlier indicates, this blurring was intentional.
Gonzdlez-Torres had consciously pursued the same theme in other
projects. His well-known candy spill projects express the same idea. In
these projects large piles of small pieces of individually wrapped candies
are eccentrically spilled on the gallery floor, sometimes in the open (as in
"Untitled" (Public Opinion) of 1991), sometimes in a gallery corner (as
in the poignant and compelling project "Untitled" (Portraitof Ross in
L.A.) of 1991). Once again, audience participation is invited, even required, for the projects' success. Audience members were expected to
remove pieces of the candy, unwrap them, and place the candy in their
mouths, in Eucharist-like ceremonies. In traditional art, of course, an invisible but clearly understood wall exists between viewer and the object.
In Gonzdlez-Torres' projects that wall is torn down, or at least made
ambiguous because as each constitutive element of the project, whether a
piece of candy or a sheet of paper, is removed, it is replaced.
In this process of removal and replenishing Gonzilez-Torres added
a dimension that we seldom associate with art-responsibility. The responsibility involved in his paper stacks and candy projects is twofold:
the audience has the responsibility of participating with the artist's plan
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to remove constitutive elements and, second, the museum has the responsibility to replenish the supply of those elements according to the artist's
specifications.
This dimension of responsibility provides another characteristic that
as
art Gonzdlez-Torres conceived it shares with property. Property is not
solely a matter of rights; it is also a matter of responsibilities or obligations that the owner owes to other members of the various communities
to which he or she belongs. Just as the responsibility dimension of art is
usually sublimated, so also is the obligation dimension of property ownership.5 The view that is commonly projected of both is distorted, ownership without obligations, and much political damage results from that
distorted view. Landowners scream, or worse yet, sue, when government
land-use agencies impose regulations on the use of their land in the interest of preserving the environment, public health, or safety. Business
owners complain about abuse of rights when regulators impose restrictions on automobile emissions. The sense that property exists to create
propriety, or the common good, is simply lacking. Gonzilez-Torres'
projects remind us of its existence.
Gonzilez-Torres was quite conscious about his desire to problematize public and private categories in art. He was quite critical of public
art, as conventionally understood and presented. In an interview, he
stated,
When I started doing this work in 1988-89 the buzzword
was public art. One thing that amazed me at that the difference between being public and being outdoors was
not spoke about. It's a big difference. Public art is something which is really public, but outdoor public art is
something that is usually made of good, long lasting material and is placed in the middle of somewhere, because
it's too big to be inside. I was trying to deal with a solution that would satisfy what I though was a true public
sculpture, and that is when I came up with the idea of a
stack. 6
In Gonzilez-Torres' view, what makes a work public is not its location
but its relationship with the audience. This is a more profound sense of
public art, for it injects a dimension that is not commonly associated with
art, even public art, as commonly defined-democracy, in a participatory
sense. The artist is removed from the pedestal as the sole creative genius
5

See Gregory S. Alexander, The Social Obligation Norm in American PropertyLaw, 94

CORNELL L. REV. 745 (2009).

6 Interview by Robert Storr with F6lix Gonzllez-Torres, (Jan. 1995), http://www.queer
culturalcenter.org/Pages/F6]ixGT/F6lixlnterv.html.
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behind the work. Instead, the audience participates in the work's ongoing
process of creative destruction and reproduction.
The property theorist will notice something about this process that
throws into question an important aspect of the thing conception of property. According to that conception, the owner of the thing has the sole
and virtually unfettered right to exclude the right of the world from any
access to or use of the thing. In this respect, the owner stands in the
position of the conventional image of the artist-the sole creative genius.
Gonzilez-Torres stacks and candy projects throw that imagery into question. If we imagine the artist as owner, then these projects give us reason
to be skeptical of the claims of the thing conception of property, specifically the nature of the right to exclude. Matters are rather murkier than
these theorists would have us believe. In fact, owners do not solely control access to or use of their property; they do not enjoy absolute or
unlimited control over it. There are many exceptions to an owner's right
to exclude, imposed by federal or state laws for various reasons. As a
result of all of these exceptions, the owner comes into view less as a sole
creative genius than as, in the words of one property theorist,'7 an
"agenda setter." There are obvious differences between the situations of
owner and artist, of course. The degree to which Gonzilez-Torres blurred
the line between the artist and his audience was the result of his own
volitional decision. While property owners are certainly free to open
their property to the public, the legal exceptions to the owner's right to
exclude are not the result of choices the owner makes. Still, the basic
point regarding the blurring of lines between public and private and what
public means remains one that both have in common.
A final theme in the paper stacks and candy projects on which I
wish to dwell connects up with the object-ness of the works. Let us return to "Untitled" (Portraitof Ross in L.A.). As a number of commentators have pointed out, the installation appears to be an allegorical portrait
of Gonzdlez-Torres' partner, Ross Laycock, who died of AIDS-related
complications in 1991. The diminishing amount of candy symbolically
referred to the wasting away of Laycock's body from the diseases that
ravaged him. Hence, the project is intended to convey the sense of instability, inconstancy, and fragility, not the object-ness of art as conventionally framed. But those characteristics capture the object's symbolic
object-the human body-perfectly. The human body is inherently unstable. It is fragile and constantly degrading, even when not wracked
with disease. It is always moving towards its inevitable end and physical
dissolution, its undoing as an object.
7 See Larissa M. Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property, 58 U. TORONro L. REV.
275, 278 (2008).
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Human bodies are property, and they are things. But it is easy to
overlook the fact that they are a shadowy sort-of-thing. Gonzdlez-Torres'
work underscores their instability and fragility, characteristics that we
who inhabit bodies would just as soon ignore. Yet they are objects. We
can see them, feel them, and identify them, all characteristics that the
thing-theorists of property consider to be hallmarks of property. These
characteristics are also present in Gonzlez-Torres' installations. Like
bodies, they appear more stable and more durable than they are. In terms
of the characteristics that we ordinarily associate with objects, both bodies and Gonzilez-Torres' projects stand somewhere between diamonds
and soap bubbles, and I think that is just what he wants us to see. Objects-things-are not all of a piece, as it were; they are spread along a
very wide spectrum of types ranging from diamonds to soap bubbles.
They are variously solid and stable to ephemeral and shadowy. The lines
between these categories are blurred as often as not. So also are the lines
between public and private.
All of these insights connect Gonzdlez-Torres' art with property law
and legal theory. Henry Smith is right that property is a law of things,
but, as Gonzlez-Torres' work shows, just what things are is far more
nuanced than Smith and other thing-theorists recognize. Thing-ness is
not self-defining, and its meaning is not constant. Nor is its meaning
strictly private. Lines are blurred, both in art and law. Who would have
thought?

